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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Socio-cultural dynamics determines the training and employment of the Afghan Civilian Police (ACP) in Afghanistan. Local traditions, religion, society and ethnic groups current and past interactions with the central government and the history of police forces need to be understood as well. Each region and tribal area has its own distinct cultures and traditions that will require accommodation for the successful application of law enforcement by police. Successful policemen enforce laws and establish the legitimacy of the government. Combat is the job of soldiers. If the strength of the insurgency is so strong that law enforcement cannot be accomplished, then the ACP should be removed from the area and replaced with the Afghan Gendarme or the Army. The Afghan Civilian Police (ACP) should be trained and focused on law enforcement duties in the application of tribal and secular law at the regional level to build legitimacy for the Afghanistan government instead of performing paramilitary duties in support of counterinsurgency operations. paper presents a summary of how the ACP could better fit into the mosaic of Afghanistan and several pros and cons of the proposed solution.
The Complexity of Afghanistan for Police
Afghanistan is a diverse country with numerous tribes, ethnic groups, and religious sects spread over very challenging terrain. In addition, the operating environment for the ACP is complex as well. The complexity manifests itself in an insurgency, illegal drug trade, poor governance and corruption, organized crime, illegally armed groups, as well as normal crime. 4 Three major sources of law reside in the country: tribal law, sharia, and secular law. 5 Although there are many similarities between traditional tribal law, sharia, and secular law, enough differences exist to present formidable challenges to standard application and enforcement throughout Pashtun sub-tribes, there are very different leadership cultures, but almost all are very suspicious of outside authority. 7 The top-down tribal areas in the north and east will be more amenable to a centrally directed national police force due to their cultural tendencies for strong top-down leadership. The Pashtun south, however, will be hostile to a national police force which conflicts with their tribal traditions and law. The Pashtun tribal areas have their own versions of police forces in keeping with traditions and culture. 8 The Tajiks in Afghanistan do not organize themselves by tribe and normally refer to themselves by the valley or region they inhabit. 9 The culture and history of Afghanistan dictates that the local population will look to their local governments for solutions to their issues before they turn to a central The Afghan Police and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
The ANP consists of Afghan Civilian Police (ACP), the Afghan National Civil
Order Police (ANCOP), also known as the Afghan Gendarme, the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. 16 The ACP are the primary interface with the local population and the focus of discussion in this paper.
The ACP enforce the law at regional, provincial and district levels. This enforcement involves standard police work such as patrols, traffic control and crime prevention. The current plan is for them to spread the rule of law throughout the country. 17 Currently, the ACP is the face of the Afghan government for most of its citizens.
How the population interacts with the ACP will determine how the average Afghan views the government. If the ACP is ineffective, corrupt and unavailable, then the Afghan citizens will perceive the government in the same way. 18 The goal of the international community and the central government is to create a democratic society compatible with Afghan culture. Law enforcement is the primary role of police in a democratic society. Effective police interact with the population in small teams and interact with the people in a non-threatening manner. The one-to-one interaction with civilians allows the policeman to collect intelligence, maintain situational awareness of his environment and build trust in his operational area. A large heavily armed unit faces much greater difficulties in building these bonds with the locals. As a result, a heavily militarized civilian police is not in the best interests of the government. 24 A level of trust and knowledge of an area can take months and years to build. Although the tactics and experience can be transferred to another region, the results useful for a successful COIN strategy will still take a long time. Afghanistan has the Afghan Gendarme which can reinforce the ACP to a certain level when the ACP is out-numbered or out-gunned.
25
Since COIN doctrine recognizes that successful counter-insurgencies take time, short term fixes must be balanced against long term goals. This is especially true in the use of bad and ill-trained police. As a counterpoint, it might be argued that some police are better than nothing at all. It could be reasoned that getting some police on the ground to establish law and order and extend the reach of the government to show progress and start to win the loyalty for the government will help stem the tide of the insurgency. This will seem to be a successful course of action up until heavily armed police, poorly trained in law enforcement missions, start dying at the hands of the insurgents and cannot provide either basic security or law enforcement to the population. Once incompetence in basic law enforcement tasks reveals itself and the inevitable corruption occurs, the competence of the government will be questioned.
Unfortunately, police who are corrupt and prey on the population
The Afghan Gendarme is a nationally controlled paramilitary police force that can work with the ACP to stabilize area situations before they require Army support. Employing the Afghan Gendarme to maintain the rule of law before martial law may be required is an important step in a successful COIN operation. 26 , are not trained on law enforcement tasks, and are ineffective are more counter productive for government legitimacy than no police at all. Since the police are the face of the government, the patience of the population in accepting failures will be tested and the government's standing will be lowered.
A short term fix in providing ill-trained policemen for law enforcement duties will make the insurgents' job even easier. The results of the short term fix will allow the insurgents to say "I told you so" and install their shadow government.
Training an effective policeman takes longer than training a new soldier.
Although the current training for an Afghan Soldier is longer at fourteen weeks than that for a policeman at eight weeks, six weeks difference should not be the criteria to rush more police into a job they are not trained to do. If soldiers are needed, train soldiers and deploy units to combat the insurgency. After the insurgency is contained, soldiers and units can be demobilized or moved. Police will need to remain. It is imperative that police be trained to high standards to maintain the legitimacy of the government.
Training policemen in paramilitary duties to allow soldiers to do other tasks is a mission doomed to failure in the long run. the mission between the international community partners, this approach was doomed from the start. SSR is a system that must be reformed as a whole. Delays or failures in one-sector or component cause serious ramifications in another sector. The lack of coordination and differing philosophies between lead nations caused problems still evident today. 28 The location of the original international forces in Kabul and the small footprint methodology adopted by the United Nations further narrowed the scope of the reform efforts. 29 Germany accepted responsibility for training the police force. In their tradition of a highly trained national police force, the Germans created a central police academy that focused on civilian law and produced very professional officers. The German intent was laudable but the three-year course for officers and one-year course for non-commissioned officers only produced 870 officers and 2,600 NCOs in the first three years. The numbers produced came nowhere near meeting the requirements. This approach neglected the security environment and allowed the interim local commanders and militia leaders to place their own untrained and corrupt cronies into positions of authority and become the de facto face of the national government.
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Fundamental differences separate the European and American views of policing.
The Europeans have a strong tradition of a high quality national police force. The United
States prefers the community-policing model.
The gaps in capacity and capabilities were magnified by the differences in employment and control of police between the US and Europe law enforcement traditions. 31 The difference between community policing and the national system are legal and political. The European policing system serves the state first while community-policing system serves local communities first.
Although there seems to be an overriding desire to extend the reach and control of the central government through a national police force, the tension between the two systems may be creating future problems for the Afghan National Police. 32 As the security situation worsened and due to U.S. dissatisfaction with the scope and speed of the German efforts, the U.S. assumed responsibility for the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and police force training in 2006. 33 The organization responsible for police training is the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).
By July 2007, under U.S. direction, 71,147 rank and file police had received training.
The course at the regional centers includes eight-week basic training for literate recruits. Unfortunately buying equipment and placing it into the hands of ill-trained and possibly corrupt individuals does not cause real reform or improve the efficiency of the police or their standing in the public's eye. 38 Realizing that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a system, CSTC-A's current efforts, with the support of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics
As mentioned earlier, if the police do not receive the training for law enforcement, they cannot perform their vital role in a counterinsurgency.
Training them as a paramilitary force moves them farther away from law enforcement expertise and roles and actually makes them even less useful in a COIN role. The U.S.
decision to give the leading role in its police programs to the Department of Defense did not help this conundrum and further blurred the distinction between the military and police.
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), focus on a greater unity of effort within the international community toward reforming the entire rule of law system, to include the police. 39 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and CSTC-A are working to set the conditions for improvement. Pay reform, grade reform, elimination of private militias and use of police mentor teams with the ACP are the more important initiatives that are starting to show results. 40 The reform efforts have lessened the corruption and bloated bureaucracy of the MOI, but have had little effect on improving the effectiveness of ACP at the local level. 41 The thesis to focus on law enforcement of tribal and secular law over paramilitary duties for police under the control of regional governments is not without controversy.
This paper will now briefly examine the arguments for and counterpoints against the thesis by examining the three main parts: law enforcement over paramilitary, tribal law and secular law over solely secular law and local control over central control.
The Primacy of Law Enforcement over Paramilitary Duties
The police's primary role is to prevent crime. The population expects their policemen to provide a safe and secure environment to safeguard their families and property from crime. The crime referred to here does not encompass organized crime such as drug trafficking by cartels or attempting to label all insurgents criminals and grouping everything they do as crime. The crimes that the ACP deal with are the routine acts such as thefts, personal assaults and disputes, and traffic law enforcement. 42 Since the police are the most visible, omnipresent and powerful face of the government to the normal civilian, any feelings the population has about the police transfers to the government and its legitimacy. The individual thievery, bodily assaults, traffic violations and corruption affect the sense of security of most of the population.
Therefore, the prevention of crime as it affects the individual remains the primary focus of law enforcement policing. 43 The inability of the police forces to control crime reduces the legitimacy of the government. Efficient and honest policing goes to the very essence of creating a nation-state. National institutions must provide security and justice for a government to be regarded as legitimate. Currently, the Afghans regard the police as a source of fear instead of security. 44 The police are a successful part of a COIN program only if they are effective policemen. Making them auxiliary soldiers, paramilitary forces or economy of force units at the expense of law enforcement expertise does more harm than good. 45 If police are being attacked by organized insurgents, the correct response is not to give them military training and military equipment. The correct response is to provide them protection through army units trained to handle combat so the police can do their law enforcement mission. Without the protection, the police are at the mercy of the antigovernment forces and will continue to suffer casualties and desert. 46 Policemen cannot function as substitute soldiers and perform paramilitary duties as well as their law enforcement duties. The police are being forced to combat the insurgency as an inadequately trained and equipped security force. 47 In 2008, over 1300 police died, which is three times the number of Afghan soldiers during the same period. As of November, the tally for police was over 1000 killed and 1600 wounded in 2009. 48 The Taliban understand how important the police are for the legitimacy of the government and singles them out for attack. 49 Although the pay scale for police is now the same as soldiers, the lack of back up during combat operations, lack of respect or prestige from the population and high death rate contributes to an attrition rate of 20% per year.
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There is also the counterpoint idea that law enforcement, regardless of law enforcement training and laws, is infeasible in the current security climate and the ACP needs to focus on paramilitary roles to defeat the insurgency and create a security climate where law enforcement is feasible in the future. The reasoning follows that the ACP are dying due to insurgent attacks and it is necessary to train them in paramilitary roles or they will not survive to do law enforcement. Even among some international police, there is the assessment that Afghanistan's security environment is unready for civilian policing; therefore, the police must remain an auxiliary military force while the current security situation continues. 51 Continuing this line of thinking is dangerous because it neglects to consider that the lack of law enforcement is actually allowing the security situation to deteriorate. The lack of law enforcement is not just in the crimes that the insurgents commit, but also in lack of legitimacy that the locals feel towards the government because they feel unprotected from common crimes and criminals.
The problem with this line of thinking is that it assumes that the security situation can only be improved by military means. It assumes that once the insurgents are removed, then law enforcement can start or resume. 52 This insecurity leaves an opening that the insurgents, and especially the Taliban, have been able to successfully exploit through their use of night letters and a shadow government. 53 Unfortunately, policemen trained in paramilitary duties are not going to be the best personnel to conduct law enforcement among the population. As noted earlier, the mindset for law enforcement and combat is entirely different and not easily switched.
One of the hardest objections to overcome for training and using police in a law enforcement role is the education level of the Afghan population. There is the view that the Afghan police force recruits are too illiterate to train in law enforcement duties and are better suited for a paramilitary role. It is much easier and quicker to train a recruit to be soldier who is part of unit subject to supervision than it is to train a recruit to be a policeman to operate with little to no supervision and daily interaction with the local population in complex situations that require on the spot judgments. The inability to read the law, apply forensics techniques, read and understand standard operating procedures, or fill out reports severely curtails the Afghan's ability to practice modern police work. 54 Tribal Law and Secular Law over Solely Secular Law
The ability to perform modern police work will develop over a generation as the education system produces personnel able to function in a modern bureaucracy.
Until then, police trained in the basic concepts of civil rights, evidence collection and service to the population under the guidance of the traditional tribal structure will need to suffice.
The employment of police in law enforcement roles needs to reinforce existing tribal culture and mechanisms for justice that will ensure a greater chance of success for the police and the people. The mechanisms for justice in many areas are long standing. For generations, tribal elders and village councils have been dispensing justice and enforcing societal norms according to traditional or tribal law. There is some concern that thirty years of war may have subverted customary traditional law, but centuries of tradition are difficult to erase. In the near term and probably for much longer, the national set of laws should allow the traditional tribal systems in place to take priority in those areas where tribal law could be effective. 55 A set of laws that has acceptance among the people will do more to provide for security than a universal set of written laws that are very unfamiliar and cannot be read. The police will have greater success in enforcing a set of laws that everyone is familiar with instead of decrees issued by a central government. A return to traditional laws will do more to calm the countryside than a top-down enforcement of secular law at this point in Afghanistan's history. A melding of secular law dealing with capital crimes and serious offenses with tribal law could then take place over a generation once stability or a rough equilibrium between national and local governments has returned. 
Conclusion
There is nothing more wasteful than trying to solve the wrong problem more efficiently. To manage a wicked problem like the role of the Afghan Civilian Police (ACP) in the current counterinsurgency environment, the socio-cultural dynamics of history, society and tradition, and roles of police and soldiers must be integrated into a solution.
The least bad option is for the Afghan Civilian Police to be trained and focused on law enforcement duties in the application of tribal and secular law at the regional level to build legitimacy for the Afghanistan government instead of performing paramilitary duties in support of counterinsurgency operations.
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